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What Can Legal Academics Add to the Debate About 
Private Equity? 
Best Letter to the Editor, 2016 
Simon Witney* 
Dear Editor, 
In December 2015, Unite – Britain’s largest trade union – called on the 
UK government to investigate the ‘secretive machinations of private equity 
firms’ following the near-collapse of Fairline Boats, a Northamptonshire yacht-
builder employing well over 400 people.1   Unite’s demands were not new: as the 
economic influence of private equity firms has increased in Europe over the last 
few decades, so have the calls from unions, politicians and the media for 
regulators to intervene. 
But it is not entirely clear what private equity’s critics want the regulators 
to do.   
More transparency perhaps? Voluntary guidelines – adopted in 2007 by the 
UK’s private equity trade association, the British Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association (BVCA) – already mandate listed company-like disclosures 
for the largest private equity-owned companies,2 but for smaller businesses (like 
Fairline Boats) it is far from obvious why companies owned by private equity 
should be treated any differently to any other privately-owned company, all of 
whom are already subject to statutory public disclosures. 
Meanwhile, private equity’s critics in the UK and, probably more 
importantly, other parts of Europe, have given impetus to the European 
Commission who, as part of its response to the financial crisis, introduced far 
* Ph.D. Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
1 <http://www.unitetheunion.org/news/call-for-probe-into-private-equity-firms-as-nort
hamptonshire-boat-builder-goes-into-administration/> accessed 9 February 2016.
2 Information on the Guidelines and their enforcement by the semi-independent Private
Equity Reporting Group is available here: <http://privateequity reportinggroup.co.uk/>
accessed 9 February 2016.
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reaching EU-wide regulation of the ‘alternative investment funds’ industry.3 
Taking up the cause of transparency, the Commission required greater 
disclosure by buyout houses taking over larger EU companies, and outlawed 
some types of ‘asset stripping’ in the two years following the acquisition.4  How 
effective these changes turn out to be, remains to be seen, but there certainly 
does not seem to have been much background work by policy-makers to justify 
the new rules or assess their impact. 
That may not be surprising, given the perceived need for ‘quick fixes’ after 
the Financial Crisis (even though there was no convincing evidence that private 
equity played any part in causing the crisis, or adding to the systemic risks which 
exacerbated it).  But it is also notable that regulators had little home-grown 
corporate governance law scholarship to draw upon in designing their regulatory 
response.5 
It is true that there is considerable research on the economic impact of 
private equity, including from the LSE’s own Abraaj Group Professor in 
Finance and Private Equity, Ulf Axelson.6 On the whole, academics have 
concluded that private equity-backed companies are more efficient than their 
publicly listed counterparts, and perhaps also than their privately-owned peers.7 
Their impact on wages and employment remains somewhat controversial, 
although there is no convincing academic support for the short-term asset 
stripping accusations often levelled at the industry.8   
3 The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (2011/61/EU). 
4 See Directive 2011/61/EU, Articles 26-30, implemented in the UK by the Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/1773) Regulations 34-44. 
5 A very important contribution was subsequently made in 2013 by the LSE’s Carsten 
Gerner-Beuerle, Philipp Paech and Edmund Philipp Schuster, who undertook a 
comprehensive academic comparison of directors’ duties and liabilities across the EU for 
the European Commission:  <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ 
board/2013-study-analysis_en.pdf> accessed 9 February 2016.   
6 For Ulf’s details and selected publications list see <http://personal.lse.ac.uk/axelson/> 
accessed 9 February 2016.  
7 See, for example, Y Alperovych, K Amess and M Wright, ‘Private equity firm 
experience and buyout vendor source: What is their impact on efficiency?’ (2013) 228 
European Journal of Operational Research 601-611 for evidence from the UK; and S 
Davis and others ‘Private equity, jobs and productivity’ in A Gurung and J Lerner (eds), 
‘The Global Impact of Private Equity Report 2009, Globalization of Alternative 
Investments’ (Working Paper Vol 2 World Economic Forum) 25-46 for data from the 
US. 
8 A good overview of academic research is included in J Gilligan and M Wright Private 
equity demystified: An explanatory guide 2014 (3rd edn, ICAEW) 176-198 available at 
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However, industry-wide quantitative performance studies, though 
important, are not going to give the full picture, and the effect that private 
equity firms have on governance structures is under-researched, especially in 
relation to the mechanisms behind the ‘machinations’ that determine decisions 
for stakeholders.  
More research in this area is vital, because policy-makers have to design 
regulation with the benefit of evidence-based theoretical models.  But corporate 
governance scholars, at least in the legal academy, have spent much more time 
thinking about widely-held companies than they have about those which are 
closely-held. That is understandable (and presents a very worthwhile and 
interesting research topic), but we need to help policy-makers think about 
private companies – including fairly small ones.   
As anyone who has taken an undergraduate course in company law will 
know, most academic theories of corporate governance focus on ‘agency costs’: 
the temptation to ‘steal’ or ‘shirk’ when (in Adam Smith’s terms9) one person is 
charged with looking after another’s money.10  However, many academics accept 
that, when stakeholders have good and reasonably symmetric access to 
information and the right incentives, they will bargain for optimal terms, 
mitigating (although probably not eliminating) the agency costs implicit in the 
delegation of power.11  It is also commonly argued (although by no means 
universally accepted12) that the most efficient companies will be created when 
shareholders are the ultimate beneficiaries of the efforts of those in charge, and 
(if they are equipped to do so) are allowed to bargain freely for the agency-cost 
<http://www.icaew.com/en/technical/corporate-finance/financing-change/private-
equity-demystified-an-explanatory-guide-160216> accessed 9 February 2016. 
9 See A Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Cannan Edn 
New York 1776) 700. 
10 The most quoted source for this analysis is M Jensen and W Meckling, ‘Theory of the 
firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure’ [1976] 3 Journal of 
Financial Economics 305-360. 
11 See F Easterbrook and D Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard 
University Press 1991).  
12 For a thought-provoking contemporary view, arguing that directors should pursue a 
societal purpose, insulated from profit maximising shareholders, see W Hutton, How 
Good We Can Be (Little Brown 2015) 137-142. 
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mitigating structures which suit them best.13 
However, the UK’s corporate governance framework, especially as it 
applies to private companies, is muddled.  On the one hand, it pays attention to 
the ‘freedom to contract’ paradigm implied by the theory described above; but it 
is also peppered with apparently mandatory rules.14  It is not always clear who 
these rules are designed to protect, and many of them turn out to be 
contractible in any event.15 Justifications for mandatory rules in widely-held 
companies may not apply to closely-held companies, with the consequence that 
designing optimal corporate governance frameworks in this environment may 
be more costly than it needs to be, and efficient outcomes may be thwarted.   
On the other hand, if there is a case for mandatory rules designed to 
protect other stakeholders who do not have a seat at the table when private 
company constitutions are written, that case needs to be articulated on a sound 
theoretical footing.  If the case is made, the mandatory rules which it implies 
will, no doubt, be quite different to the ones we have.  But if that case fails, it 
certainly does not undermine the case for protecting those stakeholders in other 
ways: through, for example, enhanced employment protection rights, or tougher 
regulations prohibiting pollution or other actions giving rise to externalities 
which rational shareholders would not internalise. That is, after all, the more 
usual way in which we protect third parties. 
In the end Fairline Boats (now renamed Fairline Yachts) seems to have 
been saved,16 although with significant job losses.  That may or may not have 
been the best available outcome for society at large, but it is not clear what legal 
13 For a clear and entertaining exposition see S. Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy: The 
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’ [2003] 97 Northwestern University Law 
Review 547.   
14 I have written elsewhere about some of the problems for non-executive directors 
posed by the mandatory rules on conflicts of interest: see S Witney, ‘Corporate 
opportunities law and the non-executive director’ [2016] Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14735970.2015.1117349> 
accessed 9 February 2016.   
15 Perhaps the most famous example is the House of Lords decision in Bushell v Faith 
[1970] AC 1099, in which it was held that the contractual nature of company law 
(allowing the company’s constitution to decide which shares get to vote on any particular 
resolution) allowed directors to entrench themselves with weighted voting rights even 
though a mandatory rule says that they will always be removable by ordinary resolution. 
16 See R Davis, ‘Fairline Boats former staff “queuing at gates” to work after Russian 
takeover’ The Guardian (London 26 January 2016) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jan/26/fairline-boats-staff-queuing-
gates-work-russian-takeover> accessed February 9 2016.  
Simon Witney 
changes, if any, could have led to a better one.  If any part of the answer to that 
question lies with the UK’s corporate governance laws (and, perhaps just as 
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